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It has been such a pleasure for me and my wife to join you here to celebrate
the 25th anniversary of the Luodi shenggen 落地生根 conference organized in San
Francisco in November 1992 that led to the establishment of the International So-
ciety for the Study of the Chinese Overseas (ISSCO). I want to congratulate the
organizers of this conference, and especially Professor Wang Wei and her aca-
demic colleagues, for the splendid job they have done in bringing together so
many scholars who have done research on the Chinese overseas. In particular, I
am impressed by the way the program includes studies not only of the past and
present but also papers offering thoughts about the future. That is what Wang
Ling-chi and his colleagues at the University of California Berkeley had initiated
and I recall how their vision of the growing importance of the subject led to the
formation of the society. Ling-chi is here this evening and I am sure he will agree
with me that it was the excitement generated at the conference that inspired the
formation of our society.
They do not stay
Since this is an anniversary event, it is appropriate to begin with a brief over-
view. People from northern China had travelled across the sea to the Korean pen-
insula and Japan from ancient times. By the 2nd century CE, Han dynasty officials
and merchants became more interested in the natural products from the south,
from the Nanhai (southern sea). After that, Buddhist pilgrims also travelled by sea
to Southeast Asia and India. But, for these first thousand years, there was no re-
cord of overseas communities. It was only during the three centuries after the 10th
century that southern coast Chinese developed their own trade networks and oc-
casional reports of Chinese settling in the region may be found. These Chinese
had no official support. On the contrary, private overseas trade was banned after








gally were considered disloyal, even treacherous. Although the bans were eased
during the Qing dynasty, there was no question of acknowledging the communi-
ties overseas.
The dynastic governments cared little for their subjects who stayed overseas.
When Chinese were massacred in Manila and Batavia during the 17th and 18th cen-
turies, there was no acknowledgement that they were imperial subjects and no
action was taken to offer them protection. Until the late 19th century, there was no
general term to describe the Chinese living and working abroad. In addition to
mandarin indifference to their fates, there were also conventional values against
young Chinese leaving home and not returning. Only un-filial sons and criminals
would do that. The court in Beijing preferred to control foreign trade through Ma-
cao and later allowed some trade through select Chinese merchants based in
Guangzhou.
These were centuries of neglect if not denial. It was only after the opening of
the treaty ports to the West in the 1840s that a name was found for these Chinese
“temporarily” resident abroad; they were called huaqiao (overseas Chinese). Al-
though the Chinese had been forming small communities overseas for at least 500
years, this collective name implied that they would ultimately wish to return to
their homeland.
Many local towns and villages in South China had come to depend on their
men living in Chinese communities abroad, and there is now considerable re-
search about their history. But where Qing officialdom was concerned, they paid
close attention only from the late 19th century onwards. That policy change came
about largely because of two factors. On the one hand, Western ideas of nationals
and imperial subjects made the mandarins aware of their responsibility for their
countrymen overseas. This was particularly striking when their diplomats en-
countered anti-Chinese policies in the goldfields of North America and the planta-
tions in the Caribbean. On the other, they also noted how successful many of these
Chinese merchants were in Southeast Asia and saw value in engaging them di-
rectly in China’s economic development.
Huaqiao assets
The huaqiao attracted wide attention when political figures like Kang You-
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wei, Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen reached out to engage them in the future of
China. Whether the message was to seek reforms or to overthrow the regime,
these Chinese were responsive to the calls for help. Some of those who had re-
cently come from China had anti-Manchu backgrounds while others were
ashamed that China was repeatedly defeated by the West and alarmed that China
was backward and getting poorer. This not only affected their pride but also their
status and security abroad, especially those who already felt discriminated
against one way or another. Even though some in the Southeast Asian colonies be-
came rich despite that, they were successful only because they were very adapt-
able and were willing to take many risks. Many others were not so fortunate and
ended up destitute. Under the circumstances, the more successful merchant
classes were ready to help their idealistic kinsmen to connect with China and help
the country become modern and competitive and thus keep up with the rest of
the world. As a result, more Chinese officials and politicians became aware that
these external communities could be assets in China’s future development.
It is interesting to recall that Europeans trading in Southeast Asia had long
been conscious of the range and vitality of Chinese entrepreneurship. From the
16th century on, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and later British writers had been de-
scribing, some in considerable detail, the valuable role of Chinese merchants, their
versatility and skill. Although none of the studies were systematic, these records
led to studies of Chinese potential as partners and competitors, as cheap labour, as
immigrants, but eventually also as threats to colonial and imperial interests. Later
and elsewhere in the Americas and Australasia, the reactions were different. Chi-
nese labour was considered cheap and crime-ridden and, for decades, the num-
bers allowed to stay were severely cut down. During the first half of the 20th cen-
tury, the republican Chinese government could do little to help them. Thus in
most of these places, the Chinese who remained had almost become “invisible peo-
ple”.
Thus during the early decades of the century, it was the Nanyang huaqiao
who became particularly significant to the Chinese government. The response
from these overseas communities was enthusiastic, notably with the establish-
ment of modern media outlets and schools that were politically committed. These








colonial administrations and increasingly also of the nationalistic local leaders.
With growing numbers of Chinese arriving in the Nanyang, the study of overseas
Chinese questions took on new dimensions.
The subject became significant also with the authorities in China after the
revolution in 1911. The transfer from a Confucian dynastic state to a modern re-
public itself demanded fresh thinking. Most Chinese did not understand what a re-
public was, but they knew that embarking on the process of modernization re-
quired a major cultural transformation. To catch up and be as progressive and as
developed as the very powerful West was necessary if China was to free itself
from dominance by the foreign imperial forces active on the China coasts.
Chinese leaders realized that the country was starting from a very low base.
Their defeat by Japan was an eye-opener. Japan showed how to modernize
quickly and the Chinese saw that they too could do the same. But it was not easy.
China was exposed to greater internal divisions and, during the warlord period,
the country weakened even more rapidly. Then came the Kuomintang’s war
against the Communist Party followed by the Japanese invasion. For over thirty
years, the Chinese state controlled less than half of the country, its financial affairs
were burdened by growing debt and the economy steadily shrank.
Republican China was more divided than the last years of the Manchu Qing
Dynasty. The weakest moment came during the course of the Sino-Japanese War
of 1937-1945. Were it not for the intervention of the Western powers after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and invaded Southeast Asia, most of China
would have fallen and the country could have become a bundle of puppet states of
the Japanese empire. By itself, China could not have won the war.
During those decades of weakness, the reactions of overseas Chinese became
more important. Many of the communities volunteered to support the national
salvation movement, a sort of external frontline for a heightened nationalism to
save the country from destruction, not only China as a country but also as a civili-
zation. I am old enough to remember growing up in that atmosphere of fearing
that the country would be completely defeated.
There was a sea change in the way Chinese saw themselves. Prior to this,
most felt that what they shared was a common set of cultural values and had not
known China as a nation. Now they saw that the country had to become a modern
nation-state. But what was normal was still to think in terms of their hometowns,
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their families, and their particular groups, localities where their personal commit-
ments were. The idea of China as a great ancient civilization was vague. The lite-
rati classes had defined that, but there was a great gap between the small group
of elites and the bulk of the ordinary people who lived rural lives in an agrarian
economy or made a living in commerce. Even when that changed among those
overseas, and when more people in China became competitive in the coastal ports
and began to understand the capitalist economy, there was still a large compe-
tence gap that had to be bridged.
Choosing nations
Given these disadvantageous conditions, it would have been very painful for
China to transform itself. With the added problems of civil wars and invasions,
and with continued economic displacement by foreign economies taking advan-
tage of the treaty concessions, the various republican governments simply could
not overcome the difficulties they faced. It was under those circumstances that
the role of the overseas Chinese gained importance to all concerned. The huaqiao
were drawn into the politics of China. Many Chinese leaders went out to engage
the communities overseas and get them to support those in power or to deter
those who were seeking to replace the regime. The term “patriotic huaqiao” be-
came widely used wherever Chinese overseas resided.
This development did have negative results, especially in Southeast Asia
where former colonies began to establish new nation-states. After the Second
World War ended in 1945, most overseas Chinese were joyful that China was
united again even when it was the Chinese Communist Party that won the civil
war on the mainland. Although not every Chinese abroad was nationalistic, the
outside world and to the Chinese government saw them as closely linked to the
future of China.
In the post-colonial nation states, nation building had the highest priority. Na-
tionalism developed in every country that had been colonized, all now, at least in
theory, equal members of the United Nations. In this new world, Chinese national-
ism was not welcome and, among some of the local nationalist leaders, the new
Chinese government in Beijing was highly suspect. In Southeast Asia, the concept








which many Chinese families had to endure very difficult conditions in order to
adapt to new relationships with local national leaders. As it turned out, the Chi-
nese more than any other migrant peoples elsewhere became victims of the ideo-
logical Cold War that spread to the region. The nationalistic huaqiao that were
happy to see China united now came to be treated as potential fifth columnists for
Red China.
As far as I know, no other major migrant group has been put in this doubly
tainted position in which their ties with their homeland opened them to distrust
for questionable loyalties as well as to fear for their ideological proclivities, both at
the same time. That was why the subject of overseas Chinese became for quite a
while a sensitive subject. Not merely among overseas Chinese themselves, but
also among officials of the governments that were concerned about their Chinese
communities. In that context, the subject divided the Chinese communities abroad
among those who were linked to the People’s Republic, those who looked to Tai-
wan and those who tried to demonstrate local loyalties in their respective adopted
countries. For two decades in the 1960s and 1970s, the subject of huaqiao was ta-
boo and scholarly research was very thin. Within many countries it had to be
played down because it was either anathema to local nationalists or subversive to
anti-communists.
There were moments when the subject almost died out among the Chinese
themselves and was only of interest to foreign historians and anthropologists. I re-
call this as a time when only few among the Chinese overseas would take the
trouble, or run the risk, to keep the subject alive. I want to mention one of them
because he was the most persistent and deserved all the credit he received. I re-
fer to Leo Suryadinata, a former President of ISSCO. He did his work on the Chi-
nese Indonesians when the subject was one of the most sensitive anywhere in the
world. He continued his writing and research when almost no one was paying
much attention. I followed his efforts with interest, not only because it was impor-
tant in itself, but also because his writings helped me understand what other Chi-
nese communities were undergoing elsewhere in the South East Asian region and
even in other continents.
It is interesting that attitudes elsewhere in North America and Australasia
began to change from the 1960s and their “invisible people” began to speak
proudly of their Chinese ancestry. Wang Ling-chi would agree that I should single
長崎大学 多文化社会研究 Vol.4 2018
132
out Him Mark Lai (Mai Liqian) as the pioneer who set the community recovery
process going in the United States. Ironically, once research began, the scholars
found that records were better preserved and there was less sensitivity about the
subject than in Southeast Asia where many more Chinese had made major contri-
butions to the region’s development.
By the 1980s, conditions began to change again. Before that, most Chinese
were adapting themselves to new conditions, settling down and showing how
they were loyal to their nation-states and were seeking new ways to deal with a
China going through the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. They
focused their energies on activities useful to their adopted countries, notably in
commerce and industry. It was significant how many of the new nation-states did
not want their citizens of Chinese descent to be active in politics or dominate their
professions, but preferred to let the Chinese make money, especially for the coun-
try. That was the one area where the Chinese were left with more room to de-
velop and be regarded as least harmful to nation-building programs.
With the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in China, a small re-
vival of interest in their activities had begun. Linda Lim and Peter Gosling organ-
ized a major conference in 1980 at the University of Michigan to examine the
complex relations of ethnicity, identity politics and economic activity. Three years
later, my colleague Jennifer Cushman helped me organize another focused on the
theme of identity at the ANU in Canberra. Another reason for the fresh interest
was the success story of Singapore where a majority Chinese population was
building a special kind of nation after unexpectedly gaining its independence. Both
meetings concentrated on Southeast Asia. Neither anticipated the wave of new
migrations that began soon afterwards.
Ending the hiatus
It was Wang Ling-chi who ventured the bold idea that the Chinese overseas
was now a global topic of growing concern around the world when he organized
the 1992 conference in San Francisco. His call to look at the subject again placed
the stress on how the Chinese were not sojourners but immigrants. It was time to
move away from old stereotypes to examine the new role that Chinese overseas








dom. After a dozen years of the Deng reforms, China was changing rapidly from a
revolutionary communist regime to one that was adapting itself with notable suc-
cess to a global market economy.
In retrospect, it was a confused world we faced in the early 1990s. On the one
hand, the Chinese had crushed the 1989 Tiananmen activists and the world was
uncertain where China was going; on the other, the Cold War came to an end and
we had to think about a world where there was only one superpower. It was a
timely moment to think about the future of the Chinese overseas. That was also
when new kinds of Chinese were moving out on a scale that matched the num-
bers last seen during the first decades of the century.
When Ling-chi called for that meeting, he was concerned to distinguish be-
tween those who had settled down and sunk roots in their adopted countries and
new departures who intended to be temporarily resident abroad and ultimately,
as in the past, return home to China. This reminds me to add that, in Singapore
about this time, the same distinction was being emphasized when Chinese com-
munity leaders initiated a drive that led to the establishment of the Chinese Heri-
tage Centre under Lynn Pan and eventually to the publication of her excellent
Encyclopaedia of the Chinese Overseas in 1998.
Let me now turn to one of the results of the San Francisco conference, the
formation of ISSCO. I am not sure if Ling-chi expected to see the subject change
as fast as it did any more than I did. The people leaving China to live and work in
the rest of the world from then on were extraordinarily varied. It was not only a
question of numbers, but also how they represented a different kind of migration.
These were voluntary migrants who included large numbers with post-secondary
education, people with high levels of professional skills, adventurous people with
capital and assets. It was also was a time when the Chinese economy was under-
going a veritable revolution, and changing at speeds no one predicted could hap-
pen. Who could have anticipated that China today will be the world’s number two
economy? Now people both within and outside see China as an alternate power to
the United States.
Of course this is not entirely China’s doing. To a large measure, the United
States contributed to that rate of growth and the emergence of this new perspec-
tive. In addition, no one expected the politics of the United States to make other
leaders wonder if the country could continue to maintain the global leadership po-
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sition that it enjoyed for so long. That was quite unexpected. It is not surprising
when Chinese leaders now look to see what advantage they can gain from a condi-
tion where the United States seems less willing to lead the world. I was aston-
ished at the speed of China rising and of the West losing confidence. It is one thing
to expect the dynamic economic centre to shift eventually from the Atlantic to
the Indo-Pacific. It is quite another to hear the US President change his strategic
focus from the Asia-Pacific to the idea of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, a condition
that was the norm for millennia before the expanding West undermined it with
their powerful navies over 200 years ago. To speak of the Indo-Pacific reminds us
that the old world of maritime Afro-Eurasia had always been free and open. It
also suggests that President Xi Jinping’s reference to a “new era” at the CCP’s 19th
Party Congress may come from his perception of the changes that the world is
going through, and his hope that there could be some return to older norms.
The question relevant to us is how will all this affect the position of the Chi-
nese overseas? Knowledge and understanding of these communities have at-
tracted more attention during the last 25 years. We may claim that some of it can
be attributed to the work of our ISSCO members. But credit has also to be given
to the many more institutions that now do research and publish on the subject. I
do not know how many scholars have entered the field in the last 25 years. But
clearly the field has expanded. Unlike 40 years ago, when the numbers were rela-
tively small, many now venture forth to study a greatly expanded range of issues
pertaining to the much larger numbers of communities. From private lives, their
families and their adjustment and adaptation problems to the use of education for
upward mobility, the way their children and other descendants respond to local
civil life, the way they meet new and unexpected challenges, and how they now
face a rising China, there is hardly any part of these overseas lives that are not be-
ing explored and explained. This is most encouraging and we must commend all
those dedicated to the field for their achievements.
New roles to play
Finally, I come back to the rise of China and the future. It does not matter
much what Chinese overseas think about China. As China globalizes, it will con-








how we look at China’s population or its economy, the renewal of a major civiliza-
tion is a process that we must respect. The bottom line of China’s ambition is now
clearer. The country will not be satisfied to be just another nation-state. Its peo-
ples wish to shape their own distinctive culture and restore it to its old position
but this time as both a multiplex state and a modern civilization. Their search for
modernity is now being done on its own terms. That may not be what everybody
likes, not even what the Chinese overseas would like to see. But it is going ahead
anyway; it is big and ambitious, and now strong enough to map its own course. I
do not know what that will eventually look like but expect it to be part and parcel
of what ISSCO and all those studying the Chinese overseas will have to take into
account in their studies.
There is now little that the Chinese overseas do that can be totally free from
the impact of a risen China. When I was young, it was only once in a while that I
saw news about China in newspapers. Today, in newspapers online or in print
every day, there is likely to be a page or more that touches on what China does or
does not do. This has happened in just in my lifetime alone, and I find it an amaz-
ing turnaround. It is relevant to the role of the Chinese overseas and of an organi-
zation like ISSCO. How ISSCO members respond to the challenge to study the
changes, and how they try to reassess what is known of the past and how that
might help scholars think about the future are questions that we cannot avoid. I
hope that the light we can throw on these issues can help the lives of people who
come after us. These include people born and brought up overseas, and those who
are leaving China now to live overseas. Like it or not, they will also have to learn
to deal creatively with those in China who want all those overseas to be part of
one big family of Chinese while they live abroad.
I was very cheered by the speech given by Professor Hamashita because he
gave us an optimistic account of a future that is based on the past, something that
I appreciate. In one of his maps, he showed that it is possible to think in terms of
the old Hanseatic League returning in the future. He conjured an image of those
maritime linkages across borders in which peaceful developments can be free of
politics without the involvement of nation-states. These would involve only those
dedicated to trading, education, cultural exchanges and other civil tasks, people
devoted to developing new networks based on successful older networks. I found
the picture intriguing.
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But I cannot help thinking that he may be too optimistic. I fear that the world
of nation states established out of the national empires of the 19th century may not
be easy to change. The national empires were successful nation-states and they
won converts among new nationalist leaders to reproduce more nation states.
Thus all the new states are narrowly focused on their own nation’s interest. This
is of course understandable and it would be pointless to criticize the logic behind
that. All political leaders are ambitious for their own countries and their people
have great expectations. They will all have their country’s sovereignty to protect.
And they will behave in different ways from their predecessors who ruled at a
time when national borders did not exist. Today it is doubtful that any nation-
state, big or small, will surrender any part of their sovereignty to allow their peo-
ples to operate freely as networks with minimal state interventions.
In this context, the country that is actively concerned with issues of sover-
eignty and determined that the state should be involved in everything is China. If
China continues to be a highly centralized state that controls everything, includ-
ing its relationship with as many Chinese overseas around the world as possible,
that would add a new dimension to what was never there before. I had earlier
shown how traditional Chinese governments were never interested in their Chi-
nese abroad. On the contrary, they wanted their peoples to stay home. That atti-
tude really changed only in the 20th century.
It then began in a passive way by recognizing the Chinese outside, and seek-
ing to bring back all those who could be useful to China’s salvation. But that is no
longer true. What China expects in its new phase of development is to be eco-
nomically number one before long. It will not be satisfied to be a passive actor and
would hope to have the power to be active in every field. It would then be natural
that they would want to push their agenda to include all those who identify them-
selves as Chinese in one way or another. That would be seen as the normal duty
of a caring Chinese government. They would even see it as their responsibility to
reach out actively to Chinese communities everywhere.
How then should the Chinese overseas respond? If they simply sit back to
wait for the Chinese government to extend its hand in their affairs, they could
lose their ability to do what they have been doing on their own initiative in the
past. Some of their achievements show that their experiences have much to offer,








see China only from the inside. In the long run, China cannot afford to think about
the world only in its own way. Chinese overseas can still help China better under-
stand the world from the countries where they are citizens. The world order out
there is one consisting of at least 180 nation-states that need to be handled in
many different ways and there are significant Chinese communities in many of
them.
Chinese leaders are quick learners. Note how they learnt to operate in the in-
ternational world order in the forty years since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. That
was remarkable. They understand the international laws and the value of the
United Nations and its organizations. In many ways, as has been pointed out, they
have been more observant of United Nations rules than the United States. It is not
true that Chinese leaders do not play by the rules, what is true is that they skil-
fully make use of rules that are favourable. When they are not happy with some
that were made without China’s participation, they look for opportunities to rene-
gotiate them. When satisfied that rules are fair, they have played the international
game as well as anybody else.
Nevertheless, they cannot assume that the world outside understands them.
They cannot assume that the world would readily accept their way of doing
things. To the extent that those of Chinese descent outside understand the aspira-
tions of their adopted countries, they can help China to minimize differences and
any misreading of China’s motives and ambitions. And insofar as Chinese over-
seas are sympathetic with what China has in mind, they may be able to enable
others to accept China’s peaceful goals. The world has always hoped to have more
people who could make it a happier place, not just peace for the Chinese people
but for everybody. This will be increasingly complicated in the decades to come.
But Chinese overseas who are spread around the world still have a role to play.
Not only with money and investments as in the past, but also with ideas and
knowledge about the outside world that people in China still need to know. This
goes beyond the old days when they were expected to be “patriotic huaqiao”, it
would in future be more like “foreign” admirers of a modern Chinese civilization.
Not everyone in China will appreciate what Chinese overseas can do but such Chi-
nese can be assets to everyone concerned if more people did. In short, there is a
lot that Chinese overseas can do and there are new roles that ISSCO can play. So
play on so that there will be more to celebrate when ISSCO meets for its next 25th
長崎大学 多文化社会研究 Vol.4 2018
138
anniversary.
*This is the revised text of the transcript of the closing lecture at the ISSCO 25th anniversary
conference held in Nagasaki, 17-19 November 2017.
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